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Abstract
This paper begins with the presumption that rapid economic development requires
an effective state. An effective state is able to act independently of powerful interest
groups with the aim of allocating resources so as to maximize long-term economic
growth. It will be argued that such states are more likely to arise in situations within
which the state must earn its income. That is, it must construct an institutional apparatus
to extract the revenue that it needs and it is dependent upon the bulk of its agricultural
producers to produce this revenue. The higher agricultural productivity within a region,
the more dependent the state will be on revenues from the bulk of its agricultural
producers. This dependency will lead, through a dialectical process, to a state whose
activities will be constrained, a state which will be able to effectively commit itself to
long-run development. This proposition is tested using time series/cross-sectional data for
a sample of diverse countries from the 1960’s through 1990’s.

I
Agriculture’s role in the overall process of economic development has been a
much discussed topic. In closed models of economic development agriculture is seen as
providing certain necessary things for the expansion of the modern industrial sector;
food, savings, etc. From an open economy perspective the role of agriculture is much
more ambiguous. In an open setting many of the necessary things discussed above can be
brought in from the outside through foreign investment, imports, etc. Thus agriculture’s
role is much more ambiguous. It will be argued in this paper that agriculture’s role in the
process of economic development is much more subtle than has previously been
perceived in the literature. Specifically, there is a link between agriculture and
institutional effectiveness, especially the institutional effectiveness of the state.
There is now a consensus that an effective state is essential to long-run economic
development and growth. Developmental state theorists and neoclassical economists
may differ about what the state should do and how it should do it, but they both agree that
an institutionally effective state is crucial. The real question, the most important
question, concerns how effective state institutions can be established. Institutions are
important, but how are effective ones established? There is a limited literature on this
that emphasizes the role of geography, openness, and inequality (the existence of a
sizeable middle class). This paper proposes that broadly based rural development, in
particular broadly based agricultural productivity, plays a key role in the development of
the institutional effectiveness of the state. The argument in its simplest form is as follows.
All states and their ruling elites face a commitment problem. That is, a state powerful
and independent enough to establish property rights, etc. is also a state powerful enough
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to take them away. The question is how can a state’s behavior be constrained so as to
solve the commitment problem?
This paper hypothesizes that the answer lies in states and their ruling elite having
the power to raise revenue in order to do the things necessary to survive politically.
Thus, a state that is significantly dependent on a productive agricultural sector for its
revenue will become involved in a political process by which an agreement evolves as to
how much revenue can be extracted and what mechanisms are acceptable. This is a
process fraught with conflict, but eventually resulting in an institutional and social
compact that solves the state’s commitment problem.
Alternatively, a state and ruling elite dependent on an agricultural sector that is
subsistence oriented, with low productivity, will have to look elsewhere for the revenues
necessary to survive. These other sources may stem from the taxing of trade, the
extraction of revenues from mineral or illegal drug production, and/or the extraction of
revenue from a small rural elite among other sources. In this context the political process
is likely to unfold in a way that fails to solve the commitment problem or solves it for
only a small subset of the population.
This hypothesis will be tested empirically in this paper. In order to measure state
effectiveness, a number of different measures of institutional quality are used as
dependent variables (the data spans the late 1980s and 1990s). The primary independent
variable needs to be a measure of agricultural structure and productivity. In order to avoid
problems in interpretation and estimation from concerns relating to whether institutional
quality affects agricultural productivity or whether agricultural productivity has an impact
on institutional quality or both, the variable measuring agricultural productivity relates to
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1965. A number of additional control variables are also used to test for the robustness of
the results. A longer run test of the hypothesis is also conducted using a measure for
agricultural potential (biological/geographical characteristics) in existence prior to
organized human society as the independent variable in place of the measure of
agricultural productivity.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section two of the paper will review the
literature on the role of the state in economic development and on those factors that are
influential in determining institutional quality. Section three will discuss the
conventional views of the role of agriculture in the development process. In addition, the
notion that agriculture’s role may be more subtle and yet more powerful is developed.
Section four will discuss the empirical methodology and the data used and present the
results. Finally, section five will summarize the paper.
II
The states role in economic development is characterized by what Weingast
(1995) has called “the commitment problem”. That is, a state which is strong enough to
protect property rights is a state that is strong enough to take them away at a moments
notice. A state that promises investors that it will not confiscate their profits has every
incentive to do so once the investment is made and the profits are generated. Investors
recognize this and thus are unwilling to make the investment. Thus economic
development would seem to be dependent upon whether or not the state can commit itself
to productive development policies and eschew the temptation to cheat and confiscate.
In this paper it will be argued that political development is a process by which the
state gains the ability to credibly commit to development policies, whether these policies
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are providing environments conducive to investment or governing the market so as to
quickly move up the technological ladder. Political development involves the
development of institutions, both formal and informal, that constrain or direct the state to
pursue productivity enhancing rather than productivity reducing policies. Economists
now recognize the fact that institutions are a key factor in long-run growth and
development.
This perspective is bolstered with a large amount of empirical research
concerning the role of institutions in economic growth and development. Almost all of
these studies use measures of institutional quality which are linked either directly or
indirectly with the quality of the state. In other words, they are measures of the extent to
which rules, directly or indirectly, influence the productiveness of state decision-making.
Many of these empirical studies are cross-country analyses that focus on indicators
reflecting perceptions of how well governments protect property rights, bureaucratic
quality, the power of the rule of law, and the level of corruption (Knack and Keefer,
1995; Mauro, 1995). These studies and many others seem to find a strong relationship
between institutional quality and economic growth (as measured by GDP growth).
However, these early studies only identify an association between institutional
quality and economic performance, not really touching on the issue of causality between
these variables. Hall and Jones (1999) also use institutional quality as one component of
their institutional social infrastructure variable and use distance from the equator as an
instrument. The reasoning is that Western Europe has historically been identified with
good institutions and thus latitude serves as a good instrument. They also used percent of
the population speaking a European language as another instrument. They find a strong
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causal connection between institutional quality and economic growth. Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) develop another creative way to test for causality from
institutional (governmental) quality to economic growth using concepts of good
institutions, extractive institutions and settler mortality rates. 1 Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997) and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) use, in an informal way, types of crops as an
instrument for good institutions (government). 2 These institutional structures persisted
over long periods of time and thus explain the different development trajectories followed
by these different regions.
Most of the above discussion relates to determining whether institutional quality
is causal with respect to growth. However, if true, as it seems, the next question concerns
the source of these institutions. Specifically, how is a quality institutional structure
established? This issue is not clearly developed theoretically or empirically. Easterly
and Levine (2003) provide some insight as to variables or factors which influence the
quality of institutions, with the latter mainly representing measurements of the quality of
state decision making. They use settler mortality, latitude, the dependence of the
particular economy on highly concentrated crops and minerals, origin of legal
1

They argue that Europeans adopted two basic strategies in the colonization process. Certain colonies
were actually settled by Europeans and they brought “good institutions with them”. Other colonies were
not characterized by significant European settlement, with extractive institutions being the result. The
second part of the analysis presumes that the type of colonization strategy chosen was dependent on settler
mortality rates. Those areas where such rates were low, better institutions were established while in those
regions where these rates were high were those regions characterized by bad (extractive) institutions.
Finally, it is assumed that institutional structures persist through time. There is indeed a strong relationship
between economic development and settlement patterns which in turn supports the notion of the importance
of good institutions in economic growth.

2

According to these papers, Latin American endowments were such as to lead to the production of crops
characterized by economies of scale (plantation production). In these cases landownership was highly
unequal and the distribution of power was very unequal. Alternatively, North American endowments led to
the production of crops on small, family farms leading to the development of a large middle class. In the
former situation, institutions inimical to long-run growth developed whereas in the latter better institutions
promoted development.
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institutions, religious composition, and ethnic diversity. They find that settler mortality,
latitude, and crops/minerals variables are always strongly related to institutional quality,
the first negatively, the second positively, and the third negatively.
Islam and Montenegro (2002) have also empirically analyzed the determinants of
institutional quality and have included measures of openness in trade. They find that
measures of openness in trade are significantly and consistently correlated with measures
of institutional quality (such as rule of law, corruption, and government effectiveness
measures). They find little evidence that ethnic diversity has a negative influence on
institutional quality. Neither do they find any negative relationship between inequality
and institutional effectiveness.
The theoretical literature on what factors influence institutional quality is even
less well developed than the empirical literature discussed above. However, there has
been some work on this issue. Easterly (2001) has argued that highly polarized and
conflicted societies are less likely to develop an effective institutional structure. Thus the
development of consensus, in particular a middle class consensus, is found to be a key
factor. In addition to this idea, there is a large literature that argues that societies that are
highly dependent on natural resource rents are also unlikely to develop an effective
structure for institutional quality.
Economists have, in the past, argued that the discovery of natural resource rent
sources often pose a threat to an economy’s well-being. Specifically, the term “Dutch
Disease” refers to the situation in which rents from natural resources drive an
appreciation of a country’s exchange which renders the manufacturing sector less

6

competitive, resulting in de-industrialization. In particular, this argument has been
applied to countries that have experienced an oil boom.
There is a political version of the above analysis that argues that nations that are
heavily dependent upon natural resources in terms of generating revenue are also more
likely to be subject to violence and civil war, a general situation in which defective
institutional structures persist. There are two mechanisms by which this process is
thought to work. The first is the looting mechanism developed in the work of Collier
(1998). 3 The second mechanism is that conflicts over the distribution of rents often lead
to civil war. There is some empirical evidence to support these ideas. The work of
Collier (1998) and Collier Hoeffler (2000) indicates that controlling for income per
capita, ethnic fragmentation, and income inequality, dependence on oil and/or minerals
dramatically increases the likelihood of civil war.
This literature, it will be argued below, ignores the role of agriculture in
influencing the quality of institutions. Thus the next section of the paper expands the
analysis by examining how productivity in agriculture would influence political
development.
III
The role of agriculture in economic development may be more subtle and
sophisticated than what has previously been thought. Specifically, there may be a causal
relationship running from broad based agricultural growth to the development of an
effective institutional structure. The causal relationship, in all probability is likely to run
both ways, agricultural development to institutional quality and institutional quality to
3

Rebel organizations are likely to find a ready source of revenue that can be used to fund violent activities
if they can control regions where natural resources are located. Looting and the extortion of funds from
manufacturing firms is less likely since such firms are more mobile.
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agricultural development. However, this paper will concentrate on the former rather than
the latter.
Moore (1998 and 2001) provides some help in clearly thinking about this issue.
He argues that political and institutional development is a dialectical process whose
characteristics are influenced by how the state raises its revenue. More specifically, he
argues that one should make a distinction between earned and unearned state income.
States earn their income if they have to work closely with their citizens in order to
generate revenue. The effort that Moore is talking about is of two types. The first is
organizational effort and by that he means the extent to which the state has to construct a
bureaucratic apparatus for the collection of revenue and the proportion of its citizens that
are reached in these revenue collection activities. The second aspect involves the extent
of reciprocity between citizens and the state. That is, the extent to which there is the
provision of services in return for revenue. Alternatively, unearned income derives from
a few sources, requires little organizational and political effort to collect, and involves
little interaction between the state (ruling elite) and the mass of citizens. 4
This distinction is important because it tells something about the political
development process. States (ruling elite) that rely upon earned income are more likely
to become politically and institutionally developed, able to solve the commitment
problem. This occurs as a result of the struggle between the ruling elite and the bulk of
society over taxation and revenue. The elite, because they are dependent upon the bulk
of their society, have an interest in the prosperity of their society while the bulk of society

4

The most extreme examples of sources of unearned income are mineral revenues (oil) and foreign aid.
However, a broader view would include timber, diamonds, narcotics, and certain types of primary
commodity exports (coffee, cotton, sugar, etc.)
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have a common interest in constraining the states behavior. However, the ruling elite
must learn to behave in ways which are viewed as legitimate by the bulk of its citizens.
There is a learning process involved for the ruling elite. Initially, they are likely
to be tempted to extract as much revenue as possible by promising to provide an
appropriate investment atmosphere and then confiscating the profits of any investments
made, utilizing a patron-client form of politics to remain in power. However, resistance
to confiscation and excessive taxation within the society is likely to act as a punishment
mechanism aimed at curbing such “cheating” upon the part of the ruling elite. This
resistance may be direct and active or it may be indirect. The latter occurs as producers
hide output, understate income, reduce market trading, etc. It is out of this struggle that
constraints to cheating behavior become binding. The state learns that its revenue suffers
when commitments are broken and rises when they are kept. Because the ruling elite are
dependent upon the bulk of society for its revenue, through this conflicting, dialectical
process it learns to foster the wealth of the bulk of its citizens.
Contrast this process with one in which the government or ruling elite rely mainly
on unearned income. In this context the revenue supporting the ruling elite comes from
outside (say foreign aid) or from a small segment of society (oil production). The fact
that the elite are relatively autonomous from their populations implies that they are
unlikely to have much interest in the economic needs and capabilities of the bulk of the
population. There is likely to be little interaction between the state and its citizens with
the latter incapable of articulating issues of concern. In addition, the state would have
little interest in creating and developing an effective civil service bureaucracy.

9

In utilizing this approach, one must consider that for most developing countries
agricultural production is likely to be the main potential source of earned income, at least
initially. This is due to the fact that much of the population is employed in agriculture
and a large share of GDP originates from this sector. If a ruling elite is to extract revenue
from agriculture it would most certainly have to create a bureaucratic structure to
penetrate the countryside. In addition, in order to successfully extract revenue from the
countryside services will likely have to be provided in return such as transportation,
roads, credit, etc. Thus the agricultural sector would likely be the source of earned
income for most developing countries.
The extent to which agriculture can serve as a source of income is certainly
dependent on its productivity. Thus one would expect that highly productive agriculture
sectors are more likely to provide the ruling elite with opportunities to earn their income.
Attempts to extract such revenue will, according to Moore’s analysis, result in political
development. In order to maintain its revenue flow, the state will have to create an
institutional infrastructure that both enhances future productivity growth while at the
same time providing an effective and efficient mechanism for extracting revenue.
Alternatively, those countries characterized by an agricultural sector with low
productivity will have little incentive to earn their revenue or income. Instead, the
incentive is likely to be to behave in a predatory fashion. These countries are likely to
have primary product export sectors earning revenue from foreign sales. Thus taxing this
trade is likely to represent the main source of revenue. As a result, there is no incentive
to foster productivity growth for the bulk of the subsistence oriented farmers. Political
and institutional development is not likely to occur.
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The main hypothesis to be tested then concerns the relationship between
agricultural productivity and political and social development. Specifically, higher
agricultural productivity provides sources of earned income for the ruling elite and the
process of earning that income is likely to result in improvements in institutional quality.
Alternatively, those nations in which agricultural productivity is low are likely to be
situations in which the ruling elite are dependent on unearned income and, as a result,
little improvement in institutional quality is likely to occur.
One must, of course, recognize that while high agricultural productivity is here
hypothesized to lead to improvement in institutional quality, it is also very likely that the
reverse also holds. That is, improvements in institutional quality will result in increases
in agricultural productivity. Thus care must be taken in specifying the empirical model
such that only the causal influence from agricultural productivity to institutional quality is
measured. This is done in three ways. First, measures of the productivity in agriculture
are developed for the 1960s while the measures of institutional quality are taken from the
1990s. The argument here is that in this context it is possible for agricultural productivity
in the 1960s to have a causal impact on institutional quality in the 1990s, but it is not
possible for institutional quality in the 1990s to influence agricultural productivity in the
1960s. Thus any significant statistical relationship between agricultural productivity and
institutional quality likely runs from the former to the latter. The second approach to
determining the direction of causality is to make use of an instrumental variables
approach in the analysis. Finally, to ensure that any reverse causal influence from
institutional quality to agricultural productivity is excluded, measures of bioconditions
which reflect agricultural potential are also used as an independent variable. These are
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truly exogenous biological conditions that could not possibly have been influenced by
institutional quality.
IV
In order to test the hypothesis presented above, data on institutional quality is
utilized. Indicators of institutional quality are drawn from the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) and include: repudiation of contracts by the government (REPGOV),
bureaucratic quality (BQLTY), rule of law (RLAW), expropriation risk (EXPRSK), and
corruption (CORR). Expropriation risk, rule of law, and repudiation of contracts by the
government are interpreted on measures of security of property rights and contracts. The
higher the score (ranging from 0 to 10), the more protective of property rights the state is.
Corruption in government and quality of bureaucracy are taken as measures for the
general efficiency with which government services are provided. The higher the score
the more efficiently government services are provided. The scores for each of these
variables cover the period from the 1980s to the late 1990s. The values for the 1990s
were averaged for each country for each of the five indicators. Thus there are five
different measures of institutional quality used as dependent variables for each country. 5
In order to test the hypothesis outlined in the previous section some measure of
agricultural productivity at the beginning of the postwar period is needed. Agricultural
productivity data might be used, but that is also not readily available. In its place a
measure of the degree of usage of modern inputs was used, specifically, the intensity of
5

Additionally, aggregate variables of institutional quality such as the one used by Hall and Jones (1999),
Bockstatte, Chanda, and Putterman (2002) and Olsson and Hibbs (forthcoming) were also estimated and
results were very similar to the ones presented with the individual institutional quality measures. These
results are available upon request. Moreover, a quantitative measure of institutional quality is constructed
by considering the average tax paid as a percentage of GDP, which is the state’s income. Regressions
similar to the once presented here are conducted using the average tax measure as a dependent variable and
the results remain unchanged in terms of interpretational significance. These are available upon request.
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the use of fertilizer as measured by kilograms per hectare (LFERT(65)). The year for
which the data is utilized is 1965 and the data is taken from the FAO. It is hypothesized
that an increase in the intensity of fertilizer use in 1965 indicates a more broadly
modernized agriculture sector and this will have a positive causal effect on institutional
quality in the 1990s. One can alternatively assume the fertilizer measure signaling the
importance of improving agricultural productivity for the country. In other words, it is a
measure of initial effort made by a country to maintain and improve the agriculture sector
which, in turn, would lead to better institutional quality in the future.
A possible criticism of the agricultural productivity measure being used in this
paper could be that while it is acceptable to both Latin America and Africa, where the
proportion of agriculture out of the economy is very high, it may be a poor proxy variable
in both Western Europe and East Asia. In order to address this issue a second measure of
agricultural productivity was also utilized. It represents a much broader measure of
technology (MODERNIZATION). Specifically, it is an interaction term in which
fertilizer intensity is multiplied by tractor intensity (1965) which is in turn multiplied by
secondary education enrollment rates (1960). The tractor intensity variable is taken from
the FAO while secondary enrollments come from Bockstatte, Chanda, and Putterman
(2002). The correlation between LFERT(65) and MODERNIZATION is statistically
significant and high (0.78). This broader measure of agricultural productivity is likely to
be as relevant for East Asia and Europe as well as for other regions of the world.
In addition to the above, a number of other control variables were also added.
One is the average growth rate of GDP per capita from 1960 to 1980 (GR6080) which is
included because some scholars have argued that rapidly growing countries are better
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able to afford better quality institutions. In addition, since a more educated population
may be better able to construct good quality institutions, the secondary school enrollment
rate for 1960 is included (SCHOOL(60)) in the estimation using fertilizer intensity.
However, this variable is not used when the broader measure of technology
(MODERNIZATION) is used. Since some theoretical work indicates that ethnically
divided societies are less likely to construct effective states, an ethnolinguistic
fractionalization (ELF(60)), originally computed by Taylor and Hudson (1972) for 1960
is added. Previous theoretical work also indicates that the degree of openness of a nation
may influence the quality of its institutions. To measure this, the instrumental variable
constructed by Frankel and Roemer (1996) is utilized. It is the (log) predicted trade share
of an economy, based on a gravity model of international trade that only uses a country’s
population and geographical features (LOGFRANKROM). Also a series of regional
dummy variables were added (East Asia-Pacific (EAP), Latin America-Carribbean
(LAC), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia (SA), Western Europe (WE), Middle EastNorth Africa (MEN)). 6
In addition to the above variables, a measure of state antiquity constructed by
Bockstatte, Chanda, and Putterman (2002) is included as a control variable
(STATEHIST). In the paper the authors find the state antiquity variable to be statistically
significant in explaining average long-run economic growth in a cross-section of
countries. 7 In this paper the question will be to test to what extent state antiquity can

6

We wish to thank Valerie Bockstatte, Areendam Chanda, and Louis Putterman for making much of this
data available to us.
7
Bockstatte, Chanda, and Putterman (2002) argue that the older the state is the more likely that it will have
developed an effective institutional structure and thus the more capable it would be of carrying out a longrun growth process. In order to test this proposition the authors develop a measure of state antiquity which
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explain the quality of institutions in the 1990s. The relationship between the quality of
institutions and agricultural technology is the main focus of this paper. In order to test
this relationship multivariate regression analysis is utilized incorporating these two
variables and the control variables discussed above. The model can be written as
(1)

INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY (five measures) = a0 + a1LFERT(65) + a2ELF(60)
+ a3GR6080 + a4STATEHIST + a5SCHOOL(60) + a6LOGFRANKROM +
a7EAP + a8LAC + a9SSA + a10SA + a11WE + a12MEN + ε,

where STATEHIST is the measure of state antiquity, SCHOOL(60) is the secondary
school enrollment rate in 1960, LOGFRANKROM is the log of the Frankel and Roemer
openness variable, EAP is a dummy variable for Latin America and the Caribbean, SSA a
dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa, WE a dummy variable for Western Europe, and
MEN a dummy variable for the Middle East and North Africa. As mentioned earlier the
equation is also estimated using the alternative and broader measure of agricultural
productivity, MODERNIZATION. Those results are presented in Table One.

A number of interesting things can be seen. Most importantly, the measure of
agrarian structure in 1965 has a statistically significant influence on four of the five
measures of institutional quality and the signs are positive. This implies that productive
agrarian structures in 1965 are related to effective institutions in the 1990s.

is an index based upon the extent to which a non-tribal government existed, whether it was locally based or
foreign, and the extent to which the territory of the modern country was ruled by this government.
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Table One: REPGOV, BQLTY, RLAW, EXPRSK, CORR as the dependent variable
dependent variable Æ REPGOV
BQLTY
RLAW
EXPRSK
CORR
0.26
0.22
0.09
0.23
0.21
LFERT(65)
(2.75)*** (2.73)***
(1.34)
(3.19)***
(2.75)***
ELF(60)
-0.25
-0.85
-0.93
-0.42
-0.81
(-0.37)
(-1.77)*
(-1.96)
(-0.82)
(-1.83)*
0.77
0.59
0.84
1.05
0.05
GR6080
(1.98)*
(1.92)*
(2.43)**
(2.98)***
(0.14)
0.33
-0.60
-0.49
-0.53
-0.09
STATEHIST
(0.49)
(-0.85)
(-0.69)
(-0.83)
(-0.15)
0.18
0.17
0.20
0.14
0.20
SCHOOL(60)
(2.67)*** (2.62)*** (3.04)*** (2.19)***
(3.26)***
0.09
-0.52
-0.67
-0.51
-0.59
EAP
(0.18)
(-1.02)
(-1.31)
(-1.19)
(-0.95)
-1.10
-1.82
-1.66
-1.71
-1.24
LAC
(-2.25)** (-4.45)*** (-3.44)*** (-4.34)*** (-2.19)**
-0.91
-0.37
-0.65
-1.00
0.19
SSF
(-1.50)
(-0.67)
(-1.21)
(-2.03)**
(0.30)
-0.94
-0.44
-1.43
-0.77
-0.79
SA
(-1.61)
(-0.79)
(-2.02)**
(-1.09)
(-1.26)
0.64
0.32
0.11
0.27
-0.10
WE
(1.09)
(0.58)
(0.17)
(0.48)
(-0.16)
-0.69
-1.08
-1.38
-1.18
-0.65
MEN
(-1.27)
(-2.29)**
(-2.39)**
(-2.25)
(-0.97)
-0.29
-0.35
-0.11
-0.26
-0.01
LOGFRANKROM
(-1.68)*
(-1.86)*
(-0.56)
(-1.36)
(-0.04)
Observations
80
80
80
80
80
R2
0.79
0.75
0.72
0.77
0.70
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics with *** significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%; all
estimations include a constant term not reported here.
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Other than the significant and positive impact of agricultural productivity in 1965,
according to the above sets of results, secondary enrollment rates in 1960 had a
significant positive effect on all five measures of institutional quality in the 1990s. The
average growth of GDP per capita from1960 to 1980 would seem to also be positively
related to the quality of institutions in the 1990s, at least for four of the measures of
quality. Finally, of all the dummy variables utilized, that for Latin America consistently
seems to have a negative effect on institutional quality. The Middle Eastern variable is
significantly negative for three of the measures and the Sub-Saharan dummy for one
measure.
The equations were re-estimated utilizing the broader measure of agricultural
productivity (MODERNIZATION). The results for all five measures of institutional
quality are presented in Table Two. As can be seen, the modernization variable has a
significant positive effect for all five measures. Moreover, as expected, the results using
MODERNIZATION instead of LFERT(65) find some differences in terms of the impact of
the regional dummies. In Table Two it can be seen that along with Latin America and
Sub-Saharan Africa, there are additionally several instances of a statistically significant
negative impact of South Asia (in three cases), East Asia pacific (one case), Western
Europe (one case, positive) and the Middle East and North Africa (two cases).

17

Table Two: Using MODERNIZATION to Measure Agricultural Productivity
dependent variable Æ
CORR
BQLTY
REPGOV
EXPRSK
RLAW
0.14
0.15
0.18
0.13
0.09
MODERNIZATION
(3.78)*** (4.02)*** (4.87)*** (4.85)*** (2.85)***
-0.69
-0.72
-0.04
-0.36
-0.9
ELF(60)
(1.27)
(1.41)
(0.06)
(0.65)**
(1.64)
-0.04
0.55
0.72
0.99
0.78
GR6080
(0.09)
(1.52)
(1.48)
(2.18)**
(1.67)
-0.39
-0.95
-0.005
-0.83
-0.93
STATEHIST
(0.54)
(1.24)
(0.006)
(1.19)
(1.09)
-1.02
-0.94
-0.37
-0.86
-1.05
EAP
(1.25)
(1.46)
(0.65)
(1.7)*
(1.53)
-1.44
-1.9
-1.09
-1.76
-2.03
LAC
(1.85)*
(3.61)***
(1.89)*
(3.77)*** (3.04)***
-0.54
-0.89
-1.39
-1.49
-1.45
SSF
(0.26)
(1.41)
(2.12)**
(2.72)**
(2.09)**
-1.37
-0.84
-1.33
-1.07
-2.06
SA
(1.72)*
(1.41)
(2.27)**
(1.57)
(2.75)***
0.45
0.88
1.29
0.85
0.49
WE
(0.52)
(1.3)
(1.83)*
(1.3)
(0.59)
-0.67
-1.01
-0.53
-1.08
-1.54
MEN
(0.77)
(1.68)
(0.82)
(1.85)*
(1.99)**
-0.07
-0.39
-0.33
-0.28
-0.2
LOGFRANKROM
(0.4)
(2.26)**
(1.95)**
(1.47)
(1.11)
Observations
77
77
77
77
77
R2
0.58
0.71
0.75
0.72
0.65
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics with *** significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%; all
estimations include a constant term not reported here.

To further test the robustness of the fertilizer intensity variable as a predictor of
institutional quality, it is included as an additional instrumental variable in the Hall and
Jones (1999) estimation using social infrastructure (SOCINF) as the dependent variable.
SOCINF is an aggregate variable which is constructed using a weighted average of the
five different aspects of institutional quality measures. In Bockstatte, Chandra, and
Putterman (2002), the STATEHIST variable is included in a similar specification to show
the importance of the state antiquity variable as a possible instrument for the Hall and
Jones (1999) estimation of social infrastructure. The results show that LFERT(65) is also
a strong candidate as an instrument for social infrastructure as presented in Hall and
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Jones (1999). The analysis was re-estimated utilizing the broader measure of agricultural
productivity (MODERNIZATION). The results presented in Table Three indicate that the
MODERNIZATION variable is still statistically significant.

Table Three: A Comparison with H/J and B/C/P
H/J

ENGFRAC

0.009
(0.13)
0.07
EURFRAC
(1.3)
0.08
LOGFRANKROM
(2.4)***
0.72
LATITUDE
(5.82)***
STATEHIST

Including
STATEHIST

Including
LFERT(65)

Including
MODERNIZATION

0.03
(0.66)
0.1
(2.4)**
0.11
(3.44)***
0.29
(1.6)
0.49
(4.41)***

0.001
(0.05)
0.05
(1.22)
0.07
(2.74)***
0.09
(0.53)
0.39
(3.53)***
0.04
(3.56)***

-0.03
(0.61)
0.11
(2.68)**
0.09
(3.28)***
0.06
(0.35)
0.43
(3.19)***

LFERT(65)
MODERNIZATION
Observations
R square

76
0.42

76
0.58

76
0.66

0.02
(3.06)***
67
0.66

Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics with *** significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%; All data
except STATEHIST and LFERT(65) come from Hall and Jones (1999); SATEHIST comes from B/C/P
(2002). ENGFRAC is fraction of a country’s population speaking English; EURFRAC is the fraction of a
country’s population speaking one of western Europe’s five main languages, LATITUDE is the distance
from the equator in absolute degrees.

In order to eliminate any questions one might have towards the exogeneity of the
relationship between the institutional quality and the measure of agricultural productivity
some measure of agricultural potential which is truly exogenous is necessary. The work
of Olsson and Hibbs (forthcoming) provides just such a measure of agricultural potential,
a bio-conditions measure. It is composed of two variables. The first is called plants and
measures the number of annual or perennial wild grasses with a kernel weight exceeding
10 mg that is known to have existed in prehistory. The variable animals is the number of
19

domesticable mammals weighing more than 45 kg that is known to have existed in
prehistory. The bio-conditions measure is the first principal component of these
variables. This variable is available for most of the countries in the cross-sectional
sample used in the above analysis.
The prehistory bio-conditions variable is used here as a measure of the potential
for agrarian productivity growth, a potential to develop an agrarian structure supportive
of institutional development. It is truly exogenous since these conditions existed prior to
the development of human institutions, or social structure. The difficulty with using this
variable is that most of the other explanatory (right-hand side) variables are likely to be
highly correlated. For example, the measure of state antiquity is likely to be strongly
related to agrarian potential. In fact, most of the right-hand variables used previously
would be highly correlated with the bio-conditions variable. Thus the control variables
used in previous estimations will be excluded. Given the above, the model can be written
as
(2) INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY (five measures) = b0 + b1BIOCOND + b2ELF(60) +ε,

where BIOCOND represents the bio-condition variable and ELF(60) is the ethnolinguistic
fragmentation variable. The results of this analysis are presented in Table Four.
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Table Four: Regression Results Using Bio-Condition and Ethnicity
BIOCOND
ELF(60)
Observations
R2
dependent variable ↓
0.58
0.50
76
0.53
Rule of Law
(4.43)***
(5.72)***
0.72
0.35
76
0.41
Bureaucratic Quality
(4.87)***
(3.23)***
0.75
0.45
76
0.50
Expropriation Risk
(5.09)***
(4.61)***
0.58
76
0.54
Repudiation of Contents 0.90
(5.47)***
(5.25)***
0.52
0.36
76
0.37
Corruption
(3.65)***
(3.43)***
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics with *** significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%; all
estimations include a constant term not reported here.

As can be seen, the bio-conditions variable has a significant positive influence on
institutional quality in the 1990s. It is truly exogenous in this specification of the model.
This is further support for the notion that the agricultural sector and its structure have an
important positive influence on the quality of institutions and the effectiveness of the
state.
The multivariate regressions results presented above make a strong case for
considering initial agricultural productivity as having a significant and positive impact on
future institutional quality of a country. In order to further test for a causal relationship
between agricultural productivity and institutional quality the next table presents the
results of using an instrumental variable (IV) analysis. The instruments used are taken
from Olsson and Hibbs (forthcoming) and relate to key geographic and bio-geographic
variables. These are major axis of continent, climate, number of animal and plant
candidates for domestication, distance from equator, and schooling in 1960. The animal
and plant candidates for domestication, distance from the equator, and schooling in 1960
variables have all been discussed above. The major axis of continent variable seeks to

21

provide a rough measure of the East-West orientation of a major landmass, believed to be
a major determinant of the ease of transmitting agricultural innovation. It is obtained by
dividing a continent’s distance in longitudinal degrees between its eastern and western
most points by its north-south distance in latitudinal degrees. The climate variable
classifies climate into four types with the number three denoting the best climate for
agriculture and zero denoting the worst. All these variables are satisfactory candidates as
instruments because all of these variables can be related to the agriculture sector and its
productivity, but cannot be related to the institutional quality variables in the 1990’s. The
control variables between the OLS and IV estimates are left unchanged except for the
regional dummies, which are excluded from the IV analyses. This is because of the
difficulty in finding appropriate instruments for regional dummy variables as well as
possible collinearity between the instruments and the regional dummies. The results are
presented in Table Five.
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Table Five: IV Estimates
dependent variable Æ BQLTY
CORR
EXPRSK
LFERT(65)
ELF(60)
GR6080
STATEHIST
LOGFRANKROM
Observations

0.52
(1.8)*
0.17
(0.7)
-1.3
(-0.47)
2.83
(1.25)
-0.25
(-0.55)
68

0.55
(3.98)***
0.22
(0.27)
-0.54
(-1.46)
0.51
(0.63)
0.36
(1.03)
68

0.46
(1.92)*
-0.5
(-0.27)
0.47
(0.22)
1.84
(1.1)
-0.14
(-0.33)
68

REPGOV
0.59
(2.18)**
-0.93
(-0.43)
1.82
(0.81)
0.96
(0.51)
-0.14
(-0.29)
68

RLAW
0.55
(1.78)*
0.61
(0.23)
-2.27
(-0.71)
2.91
(1.18)
0.18
(0.25)
68

Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics with *** significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%; all
estimations include a constant tern not reported here.

The results make it very clear that the agriculture sector and its productivity in
1965 did not just have a positive impact on institutional quality and state effectiveness in
the 1990’s, but that it was actually a causal force for a better institutional quality. The IV
estimates were also carried out for the aggregate measures of institutional quality and the
results remained unchanged indicating the robustness of the above results.
Finally, the IV analysis was repeated utilizing the MODERNIZATION variable.
The results in Table Six indicate that this broader measure of agricultural productivity has
a statistically significant positive causal effect on four of the five measures of
institutional quality.
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Table Six: Instrumental Variables Estimates
dependent variable Æ BQLTY
CORR
EXPRSK REPGOV RLAW
0.26
0.34
0.24
0.31
0.29
MODERNIZATION
t stats
(1.9)**
(2.2)**
(1.9)**
(2.33)**
(1.55)
0.52
1.64
-0.15
-0.79
1.22
ELF(60)
t stats
(1.18)
(0.55)
(0.06)
(0.32)
(0.33)
-2.95
-4.31
-1.44
-0.45
-4.45
GR6080
t stats
(0.79)
(1.07)
(0.43)
(0.15)
(0.86)
3.76
2.71
2.91
2.05
4.14
STATEHIST
t stats
(1.34)
(0.92)
(1.2)
(0.87)
(1.15)
0.53
1.27
0.48
0.59
0.98
LOGFRANKROM
t stats
(0.91)
(1.84)*
(0.81)
(0.87)
(1.15)
Observations
65
65
65
65
65
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics with *** significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%; all
estimations include a constant tern not reported here.

V
The theoretical analysis of this paper proposed that a state and its ruling elite
which is dependent on unearned income for its survival is unlikely to develop politically.
That is, such a state will be unlikely to solve Weingast’s political commitment problem.
This is due to the fact that in this type of situation the ruling elite are autonomous to
society and are thus likely to act as predators. Alternatively, a state that must earn its
income through dependence upon society is more likely to develop politically, solve
Weingast’s political commitment problem.
It was hypothesized that agriculture, for most developing nations, is likely to be a
significant source of earned income. Thus if agricultural productivity is high, large
sources of earned income exist, and political and social development is more likely to
occur. Alternatively, if agricultural productivity is low, few sources of earned income
will exist and it is unlikely that political and institutional improvement will occur.
The above hypothesis was tested three ways. First, agricultural productivity in the
1960s was used as the independent variable and various measures of institutional quality
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in the 1990s as the dependent variable in various regression analyses. Second, biological
conditions conducive to high agricultural productivity were used as the independent
variable with various measures of institutional quality as the dependent variable. Finally,
instruments for agricultural productivity were utilized for regressions with institutional
quality as the dependent variable. All of the results strongly support the conclusion that
agricultural productivity has a significant positive influence on the quality of institutions.
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